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Johnson v. Moore
Nos. 97-33, 97-7801, 1998 WL 708691
(4th Cir. Sept. 24, 1998)
L Facts'
The Fourth Circuit reported the facts as follows.2 While traveling
alone, heading south through the Carolinas in his recreational vehicle, C.
Daniel Swansen ("Swansen") befriended Richard Charles Johnson ("John-
son") and offered Johnson a ride, which Johnson accepted. Later, the two
encountered Curtis Harbert ("Harbert") and Connie Hess ("Hess") at a rest
stop. Harbert and Hess joined Swansen and Johnson in the RV and all
proceeded south together. That evening, in Clarendon County, South
Carolina, Johnson shot and killed Swansen, hiding his body under a mat-
tress in the rear of the RV. With Johnson, who had been drinking, the
remaining threesome continued on the road. They were subsequently.
stopped in Jasper County by South Carolina Trooper Bruce K. Smalls
("Trooper Smalls"), who had been alerted by a motorist that an RV was
being driven erratically on Interstate 95. During the roadside questioning,
Trooper Smalls was shot six times and killed.3
In February 1986, a Jasper County jury convicted Johnson of the
capital murder of Trooper Smalls, and sentenced him to death. Johnson's
sentence and conviction were reversed on direct appeal in 1987. A subse-
quent Jasper County jury again convicted him of capital murder. During
the penalty phase of the retrial Johnson made this statement to the jury:
I haven't been before you during the guilt phase of this trial or until now
because there was no defense for my actions, I realize that now... I have
no defense for anything or the tragedies that have occurred. All I have
is a sorrow [for] the lives that I have ruined. I realize that there were
many that I have ruined.4
1. This is an unpublished opinion which is referenced in the "Table of Decisions
Without Reported Opinions" at 164 F.3d 624 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, No. 98-7820, 1999
WL 45390 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1999).
2. New evidence calls into question or contradicts the reported facts.
3. Johnson v. Moore, Nos. 97-33, 97-7801, 1998 WL 708691, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 24,
1998).
4. , at *3.
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The jury sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of South Carolina
affirmed the conviction and sentence, and the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari.
In March 1986, Johnson entered pleas of guilty, in Clarendon County,
to murder and armed robbery in connection with Swansen's murder and the
continued use of Swansen's RV after the murder. Johnson received a life
sentence and twenty-five years respectively for the convictions. Johnson did
not appeal the Clarendon County convictions and sentences.6
Johnson sought post-conviction relief ,("PCR") in state court, filing
separate petitions concerning the Jasper and Clarendon County convictions.
The PCR court consolidated the petitions and conducted an evidentiary
hearing. The PCR court subsequently denied relief, eliminating most of
Johnson's claims by interpreting a short line of South Carolina cases to the
effect that any admission of guilt operates as a waiver of any guilt-related
errors. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of South Carolina.!
Johnson then filed federal habeas petitions for both convictions. The
district court held the majority of Johnson's claims to be procedurally
defaulted and the remaining balance of claims reasonably decided by the
state courts! Johnson then requested a certificate of appealability from the
Fourth Circuit, which was granted with one panel member concluding that
Johnson "made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right."9 Johnson raised several claims, relating to both convictions, before
the Fourth Circuit."
II. Holding
In a split decision, the Fourth Circuit held that all of Johnson's claims
relating to the guilt phase of the Jasper County conviction were procedur-
ally defaulted and that his ineffective assistance of counsel claims for both
the Clarendon proceedings and the Jasper county sentencing proceedings
lacked merit." One judge dissented, finding a due process violation concern-
5. Id., at *1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id., at *2.
9. Id., at *1.
10. Id., at *2.
11. Id., at *14. The PCR court stated that the credibility of Johnson's medical expert
witnesses was undermined due to their reliance on hearsay statements in forming their
opinions, instead of actually meeting with Johnson. Johnson assigned an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim because counsel allowed the experts to form opinions based on hearsay
statements and not interviews with Johnson. Counsel are urged to foreclose such summary
dismissal of expert testimony by having experts perform personal interviews with the
accused. Id., at *12.
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ing Brady2 claims that Johnson made in regard to his Jasper County convic-
tion and rejecting the conclusion that these claims were waived by Johnson's
statement at the penalty trial.13
III Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. Admissions of Guilt as a Procedural Bar
Johnson presented what would appear to be a massive, valid Brady
claim.'4 The exculpatory evidence detailed the recantation of testimony by
one of the two main witnesses for the defense, Hess. 5 Originally Hess had
told authorities that Harbert had killed both Swansen and Trooper Smalls. 6
However, during Johnson's trial, Hess (as did Harbert) testified that John-
son had murdered both men.17 Both Hess and Harbert had been indicted
for the murder of Trooper Smalls, but the charges were dropped after they
provided testimony implicating Johnson." Between Johnson's two Jasper
County trials, Hess notified her attorney, who in turn notified the Claren-
don County Sheriff, that Harbert killed both men and that she would be
willing to testify to that effect.19
12. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that due process is denied when
exculpatory evidence material to guilt or sentence is not disclosed to the defendant by the
prosecutor).
13. Johnson, 1998 WL 708691, at *14, 24.
14. Id., at *2. Johnson's Brady claim consisted of the following:
With respect to the Jasper County conviction for the murder of Trooper
Smalls, Johnson argu[ that 1) the State violated his right to due process
under Brady v. Ma yland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to inform him prior to
his 1988 retrial in asper County that Hess, who had testified in the first trial
that Johnson had kiled Swansen and Trooper Smalls, had recanted a portion
of her testimony and had instead indicated that Harbert was the murderer; (2)
the State failed to disclose immunity a reements with Harbert and Hess and to
correct the false impression created-y Harbert's testimony that no such
agreement existed; (3) the State failed to reveal, or correct a false impression
with respect to, the full extent of Ronnie Dale Stevenson's prior record
involvement as an informant with law enforcement, and unreliability; (41
Stevenson acted as a State agent such that Johnson's Sixth Amendment rights
were violated when Stevenson questioned Johnson with respect to the murder
of Trooper Smalls; (5) the cumilative failure of the State to disclose the excul-
patory material deprived Johnson of a fair trial in violation of the Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.]
Id.
15. Id., at *2, 22-23.
16. Id., at *10.
17. Id.
18. Id., at *22.
19. Id., at *23. The Fourth Circuit suggested that Hess's recantation would only apply
to the non-capital murder in Clarendon County. Id., at *11. However, the government's
theory hinged on Johnson committing both murders, the second one, of Trooper Smalls,
committed in order to continue the concealment of Swansen's murder. The issue of whether
1999]
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Though other Fourth Circuit panels have recently cautioned against
delving into the intricacies of state procedural law,2" this panel willingly did
so in order to avoid facing the merits of a very strong Brady claim. The
court parsed South Carolina cases and concluded, erroneously, as illustrated
by Judge Ervin in dissent, that any sort of admission of guilt was a waiver
of all appealable guilt issues under South Carolina law.21
The majority considered and relied upon South Carolina cases involv-
ing guilty pleas.22 As Judge Ervin observed, there are constitutionally re-
quired procedural safeguards in the guilty plea context to ensure that admis-
sions are made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. In McCarthy v.
United States24 and Boykin v. Alabama" the United States Supreme Court
provided minimum requirements for accepting guilty pleas in all criminal
cases. Stating that a plea of guilty amounted to a waiver of several federal
constitutional rights, the Court determined that the government must
demonstrate in an affirmative manner that the defendant's plea is both
intelligent and voluntary.26 When a court removes these constitutional
rights from a defendant who pleads guilty without receiving an affirmative
acknowledgment from the defendant that his plea was entered into know-
ingly and voluntarily, that defendant's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights are violated and the guilty plea is put aside. No such
representation was required of Johnson during his supposed admission of
guilt during the penalty phase of his trial.2 Logically, it would follow that
it was impossible for him to be giving up the rights commonly associated
the Jasper County prosecutor was responsible, under Brady, for knowing of and disclosing
important exculpatory evidence in the hands of Clarendon law enforcement may be resolved
in Strickler v. Pruett, Nos. 97-29, 97-30, 1998 WL 340420 (4th Cir. June 17, 1998), now
pending before the United States Supreme Court. Like Johnson, the evidence in Strickler was
in the hands of law enforcement officials in another county, but the circumstances of the
charge clearly put the prosecution on notice and pointed to the other jurisdiction. It is clear
that prosecutors are not relieved of their Brady obligation simply because they are in fact
unaware of exculpatory information. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (stating
that an "individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the
others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police").
20. See Matthew K. Mahoney, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 393 (1999) (analyzing Yeatts
v. Angelone, 166 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1999)); Douglas R. Banghart, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF.
J. 329 (1999) (analyzing Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835 (4th Cir. 1998)).
21. Johnson, 1998 WL 708691, at *3-9, 14-22.
22. Id., at *5-7.
23. Id., at *17.
24. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
25. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
26. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969); Boykin v. Alabama, 394
U.S. 238, 240-42 (1969).
27. Johnson, 1998 WL 708691, at *3.
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with a properly administered guilty plea, including the right to contest on
appeal any issue incident to the guilt phase of his trial.
Further, aside from the fact, also noted by Judge Ervin, that it is doubt-
ful that Johnson's penalty trial statement was an admission that he was the
triggerman as opposed to an accomplice, there are other constitutional
problems with the majority's conclusion. That the supposed admission of
guilt occurred during the sentencing phase of a capital trial also relates to the
ability of an appellate court to foreclose appellate review and the subsequent
implications of that result on presentation of mitigating evidence. The
current holding in this case suggests that future defendants would be re-
stricted from presenting mitigating evidence relating to their remorse or
sorrow in relation to the crime for which they have been found guilty.
Defendants would have to choose between pleading for mercy in front of
the jury or preserving issues for appeal. Such a restriction on presentation
of mitigation evidence directly contradicts United States Supreme Court
precedent, beginning with Lockett v. Obio,28 requiring that any sentencing
phase scheme allow for presentation to, and consideration by, the jury of
any aspect of the defendant's character, record or involvement in the crime
as mitigating evidence proffered to avoid a sentence of death." Counsel
should object and preserve for appeal any issue arising out of a restriction
on mitigation evidence presentation.
In the unlikely event that the situation discussed in Johnson should arise
in Virginia, it should be opposed as an unconstitutional barrier to presenta-
tion of mitigating evidence.3° Forcing a convicted defendant, who has not
pled guilty, to choose between permitting fundamental errors tainting the
verdict and expressing remorse at sentencing very likely contravenes the
holdings in Lockett v. Ohio, 1 Eddings v. Oklahoma,32 Mills v. Maryland33 and
McKoy v. North Carolina.34
Matthew K. Mahoney
28. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
29. Johnson, 1998 WL 708691, at *18 (citations omitted). Seealso Mills v. Maryland, 486
U.S. 367 (1988); McCoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990).
30. No Virginia case deals with admissions other than guilty pleas.
31. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that proper death penalty schemes must allow
consideration of any mitigating factor related to defendant's character or record or any of the
circumstances of the offense that defendant profers).
32. 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (holding constitutional error where court refused to consider
defendant's turbulent family history as a mitigating factor during sentencing phase).
33. 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (holding unconstitutional any barrier in determining presence
of mitigating circumstances predicated on an unanimous finding by jury of the presence or
absence of mitigating evidence). t
34. 494 U.S. 433 (1990) (reaffirming Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)).
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